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Abstract 
 This experiment develops an integrative, path-analytic model for the endorsement 
accorded formal leaders. The model contains four independent variables reflecting aspects of 
group structure (i.e., group success-failure, the payoff distribution, the degree of support by 
others members for the leader, and the vulnerability of the leader). Also included are two 
intervening variables reflecting perceptual processes (attributed competence and attributed 
fairness), and one dependent variable (endorsement). The results indicate that endorsement is 
greater when the group's success is high, when the payoff distribution is flat rather than 
hierarchical, and when the leader is not vulnerable to removal from office. Other support had no 
significant impact on endorsement. Analyses further demonstrate that the effect of success-
failure on endorsement is mediated by attributed competence, while the effect of the payoff 
distributed is mediated by attributed fairness. These results suggest that moral and task 
evaluations are distinct bases of endorsement. 
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Endorsement of Formal Leaders: 
An Integrative Model 
 Treatments of legitimacy (French & Raven, 1959; Michener & Burt, 1974; Weber, 1947) 
have distinguished between the formal position occupied by a leader and the person occupying 
the leadership position. The attitudes of group members toward both position and person are 
important in establishing and maintaining regularized patterns of influence within a group. The 
present study investigates one of these attitudes, the endorsement accorded a formal leader. By 
definition, a lower-status member is said to endorse a high-status leader if he expresses 
satisfaction with the leader's performance in directing the group, supports his use of control 
prerogatives, and wants him to continue in a position of leadership within the group. The goal of 
the present article is to develop an integrative model of factors determining the endorsement 
accorded formal leaders. 
Factors Affecting Endorsement 
 Previous research has identified various determinants of endorsement. These fall into two 
broad classes: social structural factors (i.e., properties of the group as a unit) and perceptual 
factors (properties of individuals in the group). Although prior research has investigated both 
classes, no study has yet integrated them in a single theoretical framework. 
 The present article simultaneously incorporates six determinants of endorsement in an 
integrative causal model. Four of these factors are social structural (i.e., the degree of collective 
success, the distribution of payoffs within the group, the degree of support for the leader from 
other members, and the leader's vulnerability to removal from office), while the other two factors 
are perceptual (i.e., competence attributed to the leader and fairness attributed to the leader). In 
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the present study, the perceptual variables mediate the impact of the structural variables on 
endorsement. 
 Collective success-failure. Research has documented the impact of both success-failure 
(a collective property) and attributed competence (a perceptual variable) on endorsement. 
Leaders receive greater endorsement when the group achieves its goals (Hollander & Julian, 
1970; Suchner, 1972) and when they are perceived as competent on group-related tasks 
(Hollander & Julian, 1970; Julian, Hollander, & Regula, 1969). 
 However, the interrelationship between these determinants is unclear. One might argue 
that collective success-failure affects endorsement merely because it serves as a basis for 
ascribing competence (or incompetence) to the high-status leader. To investigate this issue, the 
present study incorporates both variables in a multicausal framework. It hypothesizes that the 
effect of collective success-failure on endorsement is mediated by attributed competence, such 
that if competence were held statistically constant, success-failure would have little or no effect 
on endorsement. 
 Payoff Distribution. A second structural variable that may affect endorsement is the 
distribution of rewards within the group. This distribution can range from a skewed (hierarchical) 
pattern giving greater rewards to the leader than to the lower-status members, down to a "flat" 
distribution giving the members rewards equal to those of the leader. This variable should affect 
endorsement because the leader's reward disbursements provide a means whereby members can 
infer his motives and his concern for the welfare of the group. 
 Research by Hollander and Julian (1970) demonstrated that subjects in low-status roles 
perceive a leader as more fair and group oriented when he allocates a substantial portion of the 
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group's rewards to the members rather than to himself. This study also demonstrated that leaders 
interested in group members receive greater endorsement than those not interested in the 
members. However, previous research has not determined whether the payoff distribution had a 
direct effect on endorsement, nor has it investigated the degree to which attributed fairness 
mediates any impact of payoff distribution on endorsement. 
 The present study extends earlier work by investigating these issues. It hypothesizes that 
endorsement is lower under a highly skewed payoff distribution favoring the high-status person 
than under a flat distribution, and that this effect (if it appears) is mediated by attributed fairness, 
such that payoff distribution has little or no effect if attributed fairness is held statistically 
constant. 
 Support for the leader from other members. Blau (1964) has suggested that the overall 
degree of collective support for a leader within a group may determine the extent to which a 
given low-status member endorses him. In other words, if a member believes other low-status 
members endorse the leader, he will endorse the leader to a greater extent than if he believes they 
oppose (or refuse to support) him. 
 Some research substantiates this hypothesis. Michener and Tausig (1971) reported that 
low-status subjects endorsed a leader to a greater extent when they believed that another low-
status member endorsed him. Michener and Lyons (1972) demonstrated that a high level of 
support for a formal leader from other members suppresses a subject's inclination to overturn the 
group's status structure. 
 Nevertheless, the processes that mediate the impact of other members' support on 
endorsement remain unclear. Some research suggests that low levels of other support lead to 
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dissatisfaction with the group's goal attainment (and possibly with the leader's competence) and 
hence to low endorsement (Michener & Tausig, 1971). Other research suggests that low support 
leads to low levels of ascribed fairness and, in turn, to low endorsement (Michener & Lyons, 
1972). Choosing between alternative explanations is difficult because these studies were run with 
different fixed parameters. 
 The present study seeks a clearer picture of the effects of other support on endorsement 
by manipulating other support, collective success-failure, and payoff distribution in a single 
design. Simultaneous manipulation of all three structural variables provides a basis for assessing 
the effects of other support, independent of the effects of success-failure and payoff distribution. 
 Vulnerability. The leader's vulnerability is a fourth structural variable in the present 
design. Vulnerability reflects the extent to which a high-status person lacks security in office and 
can be ousted if low-status members no longer endorse his incumbency. Prior studies have 
investigated the impact of vulnerability on the leader's liking for the group and concern for his 
own status (Berkowitz & Macaulay, 1961) and on his use of social influence (Michener & Burt, 
Note 1). In contrast, the present study treats vulnerability from the viewpoint of low-status 
members and investigates whether a leader's vulnerability affects the endorsement accorded him 
by the group's members. 
 Although this issue has not been studied previously, vulnerability may have an important 
impact on authority-subordinate relations. Members in a group with a vulnerable leader may 
experience a heightened awareness of their ability to induce change by deposing him. If this 
causes them to adopt a more vigilant and critical stance toward his policies, one would predict 
that members accord less endorsement to a leader under high vulnerability than under low. Given 
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the paucity of previous research on this issue, the present study constitutes an exploratory 
treatment of vulnerability's impact on endorsement. 
 Summary of predictions. Overall, the present study hypothesizes that endorsement is 
higher when collective success is high, when the payoff distribution is flat (as opposed to 
hierarchical), when other low-status persons support the leader, and when the leader is not 
vulnerable to status loss. Further, attributed competence is expected to mediate the effects of 
collective success-failure, while attributed fairness is expected to mediate the effects of the 
payoff distribution. To demonstrate mediation, the present research employs a simultaneous- 
equation causal model, rather than a single-equation model such as those used in previous 
research on endorsement. 
Method 
Experimental Procedures 
 One hundred forty male undergraduates at the University of Wisconsin participated as 
paid, volunteer subjects. Serving in three-person groups, they believed that their rate of pay 
would depend on the triad's performance. 
 Upon arriving, subjects were placed in separate rooms and given written instructions that 
characterized the study as an investigation of problem solving under varying conditions of 
communication. The instructions indicated that the experiment was structured into two parts 
during which subjects would work on a collective task. In part one, they would remain in 
separate rooms where they could neither hear nor see one another; in the subsequent part, they 
would work face-to-face in one room. In actuality, the experiment terminated after part one. The 
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fiction concerning the second part served as a rationale for isolating the subjects from one 
another and facilitated the manipulation of the independent variables. 
 The written instructions also described the group's task. These indicated that on each of 
three trials comprising part one, every subject would receive several cards depicting black and 
white geometric patterns. The task was to judge what proportion of each card's surface was 
black. These individual judgments were to be combined (on each trial) to yield a collective 
decision by the group. As documented in earlier studies (Michener & Lawler, 1971; Michener & 
Lyons, 1972; Michener & Tausig, 1971), the complexity of these geometric patterns made it 
difficult for subjects to estimate their own performance and permitted the experimenter to 
manipulate bogus performance feedback. 
 The instructions further explained that the triad would be structured into a two-level 
status hierarchy, with one high-status (HS) person and two lower-status (LS) persons. The 
ostensive purpose of this status differentiation was to enhance the group's problem-solving 
efficiency by placing the person with the greatest skill in the leader role. To this end, all the 
subjects took a "judgment test" consisting of geometric patterns similar to those they would later 
encounter during the regular judgment trials. This test was administered in a central room, with 
subjects sitting face-to-face. Upon completion of the test, subjects returned to their separate 
rooms. Shortly thereafter, the experimenter gave subjects fictitious feedback regarding the test. 
Each subject learned that his performance placed him significantly below one of the other 
subjects and slightly ahead of the third. The high performer was to be installed in the HS role, the 
subject in one of the low-status roles (LSI), and the third member in the other low-status role 
(LS2). In fact, all subjects were placed in identical LSI roles; no one actually occupied the HS 
role or the LS2 role. 
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 After installation into role, subjects read another set of instructions. These indicated that 
HS had two major prerogatives. First, he was responsible for combining the subjects' individual 
judgments into collective decisions. He could combine these individual judgments in any way he 
saw fit, so the judgments by LSI and LS2 were advisory opinions. Second, HS distributed the 
monetary winnings achieved by the group's performance on the collective decisions. He had 
complete discretion in disbursing the rewards among the group's members. 
Experimental Manipulations 
 The independent variables were manipulated during the three identical trials that 
comprised what subjects believed to be part one of the experiment. Subjects were randomly 
assigned to levels on the four manipulated variables (collective success-failure, payoff 
distribution, support from other members for HS, and vulnerability of HS). In contrast to most 
experimental research, these variables were conceptualized as continuous, not as categoric, 
variables. Operationally, each independent variable had nine possible levels (i.e., 10, 20, 30, 40, 
SO, 60, 70, 80, 90), and a table of random numbers was used to assign subjects to levels on each 
of the four manipulated variables. This procedure means that the independent variables are 
uncorrelated in the (hypothetical) infinite population of subjects, although not necessarily in a 
sample. In virtually all cases, of course, the subjects comprising a given triad received different 
treatment combinations based on the random assignment. 
 Precautions were taken to assure that the experimenter remained blind to all experimental 
manipulations. Independent variables were manipulated via written messages prepared in 
advance of the experimental sessions and packaged so the experimenter would not see the 
contents. 
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 Collective success-failure. At the beginning of each of the three trials, subjects made 
individual judgments on five cards portraying geometric figures. The experimenter collected 
these and ostensibly transferred LSl's and LS2's judgments to HS, who was to make the final 
group decisions. After waiting several minutes, the experimenter distributed bogus feedback 
regarding the group's performance. Each subject received a message (called the performance 
score) which stated the following: "On this trial your group won cents. Scoring is adjusted so an 
average performance wins 50 cents; superior performances get higher scores." Depending on the 
experimental condition, subjects learned the group won an amount ranging from 10 cents to 90 
cents (in 10-cent increments). Subjects knew that a group could win a maximum of $1 on each 
trial, and this information enabled them to gauge their group's success. Collective performance 
feedback remained constant over three trials (although slight perturbations were introduced to 
preclude suspicion from excessively consistent scores). 
 Payoff distribution. After receiving the bogus feedback on collective performance, 
subjects received a "money distribution form" indicating how the group's winnings were to be 
divided among its members for that trial. This written message, ostensibly from HS, was 
transferred to the subjects by the experimenter. The message stated the following: "On this trial, 
our group won________ cents. I have decided to divide the money as follows: HS gets________ 
per cent; LSI gets________ per cent; LS2 gets________per cent." The percentage of the 
collective winnings that HS distributed to LSI and LS2 constituted the payoff variables. This 
value ranged from 10% to 90% (in 10% increments). In all cases, the money not kept by HS was 
divided equally between LSI and LS2. For example, if HS gave away 40% (retaining 60% for 
himself), each LS person received 20%. 
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 Other support for HS. Next, LSI and LS2 exchanged opinion messages expressing the 
extent to which they supported HS's leadership. The experimenter intercepted the subject's 
(LSl's) messages and returned prefabricated ones that manipulated LS2's apparent support for 
HS. This manipulation consisted of LS2's answers to the following three questions: "To what 
extent are you satisfied with HS's leadership of the group? To what extent do you endorse and 
support HS as leader? How much confidence do you have in HS's leadership?" LS2 answered 
these questions by circling the appropriate numbers on a scale ranging from low (1) to high (9). 
LS2's answers varied depending on the experimental condition, and this manipulation, like the 
others included in this study, had nine levels. 
 Vulnerability of HS. At the end of the second trial, subjects completed a brief 
questionnaire measuring the intervening variables—that is, HS's competence and fairness. At the 
end of the third trial, subjects completed a longer questionnaire that included manipulation 
checks and the measure of endorsement. Immediately after this longer questionnaire, each 
subject completed a written form to indicate whether he wanted to retain HS in office during part 
two or preferred to remove him from office. The prerogative of making this decision rested with 
LSI rather than LS2, because LSI (the subject) had ostensibly demonstrated greater task-
competence on the test than LS2. 
 A decision to remove HS, however, did not automatically guarantee the leader's 
overthrow. The instructions informed subjects that attempts to remove him carried a specific 
probability of success. These probabilities constituted the manipulation of vulnerability, and 
ranged from 10% to 90% (in increments of 10%). Higher probabilities of successfully deposing 
HS designated higher levels of vulnerability. 
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 This probabilistic component simulated natural situations, in which attempts to oust 
authorities often fail. Subjects believed that if they opted for removal, the experimenter would in 
effect draw lots from a hat to determine whether the ouster was successful. In the event of HS's 
removal, LSI and LS2 would jointly decide which of them would assume the position of 
leadership during part two. Subjects believed that the leader knew he was vulnerable, but that he 
had not been told the exact probability of losing his hegemony. 
Measurement of Intervening and Dependent Variables 
 The questionnaire completed by subjects after trial two contained semantic differential 
measures of the two intervening variables—competence and fairness. Indices were constructed 
by summing the scores on the semantic differential items (9-point scales), weighting each item 
equally. Competence was measured by the following bipolar items: unskillful-skillful, 
incompetent-competent, bungling-proficient, inefficient-efficient, low ability-high ability, inept-
masterful, inexpert-expert, incapable-capable. Fairness was measured by the following items: 
unfair-fair, inequitable-equitable, selfish-generous, self-interested-altruistic, biased-impartial, 
unjust-just. 
 
 
              Insert Table 1 about here 
 
 
 
 The measure of the dependent variable (endorsement) was on the second questionnaire, 
administered after trial three. Endorsement was measured by five questions: 
 Consider the person occupying the position of leadership. How legitimate is it for him to 
 occupy this position? 
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 How satisfied are you with the leader's use of his power in arriving at group decisions? 
 How willing would you be to have the person who served as leader this time head the 
 group again? 
 How satisfied are you with the performance of the leader in directing the group? 
 To what extent do you support or oppose the leader. 
 Subjects responded on 9-point scales. To construct the index of endorsement, responses 
to the five questions were summed. A similar measure has been used in other studies of 
endorsement (Michener & Burt, in press; Michener & Tausig, 1971; Michener & Burt, Note 1). 
Upon completion of the second questionnaire, subjects were fully debriefed and paid $2 for 
participation. 
Results 
Checks on Experimental Manipulations 
 Success-failure.  An item on the second questionnaire checked the success-failure 
manipulation. Subjects were asked the following: "Compared with the other groups, how 
successful or unsuccessful was your group at the problem-solving task?" Subjects' interpretation 
of their own group's performance correlate highly with the actual manipulation of success-
failure, 𝑟𝑟 =  .927,𝑝𝑝 <  .001. 
 
 
              Insert Figure 1 about here 
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 Payoff distribution. To check this manipulation, an item on the second questionnaire 
asked: "In your opinion, how prone was HS to distribute the group's winnings to LSI and 
LS2?" Responses correlate highly with the manipulation, 𝑟𝑟 = .907, 𝑝𝑝  < .001. 
 Other support. One item asked: "Overall, to what extent does LS2 support and endorse 
HS as leader?" Responses show a strong correlation with the manipulation, 𝑟𝑟 = .930, 𝑝𝑝 < .001. 
 Vulnerability. An item on the second questionnaire asked: "If LSI wants to impeach HS, 
what are the chances that HS will actually be removed from his position of leadership?" Subjects' 
responses correlate highly with the actual manipulation of vulnerability, 𝑟𝑟 = .939, 𝑝𝑝  < .001. 
 Overall, the checks indicate that all the manipulations proved salient to the subjects and 
that appropriate conditions were established to test the research hypotheses.  
 Reliability of measured variables. Coefficients of reliability based on internal-
consistency criteria (Cronbach's alpha) reveal high levels of reliability for each measured 
variable. The reliability of the endorsement measure is .923, which compares with figures of .924 
and .884 for the same instrument in previous research (Michener & Burt, in press; Michener & 
Tausig, 1971). The reliability coefficient for the index of competence is .958 and that for the 
measure of fairness is .919. 
Basic Causal Model 
 
 
              Insert Figure 3 about here 
 
 
 The technique of path analysis is used to analyze the experimental results for 
endorsement. This technique combines an explicit causal model with multiple regression 
ENDORSEMENT OF FORMAL LEADERS  15 
 
estimation procedures (see discussions by Costner, 1971; Duncan, 1970; Heise, 1969; Land, 
1969). Table 1 presents the zero-order correlations among the seven variables in this study, and 
Figure 1 depicts the basic causal model for these data. This model postulates that endorsement is 
caused by the four manipulated variables (with competence and fairness omitted, for the time 
being). The four independent variables are represented as uncorrelated. Given the procedures for 
sampling experimental treatments, this condition should hold true in the underlying population. 
 The predictive equation for endorsement, with the partial regression coefficients 
expressed in standardized form, is: 
𝐸𝐸 =  .360𝑆𝑆 +  .425𝑃𝑃 + .018𝑂𝑂 −  .137𝑉𝑉 + .804𝑒𝑒1.  (1) 
 In this equation, E is endorsement, S is success-failure, P is payoff distribution, 0 is other 
support, V is vulnerability, and e1 is the error term. The coefficients for success-failure and 
payoff distribution are significantly different from zero, 𝑝𝑝 < .0001, and the coefficient for 
vulnerability achieves marginal significance, 𝑝𝑝 = .07, and the coefficient for other support is 
nonsignificant. The proportion of variance in endorsement explained by this model (R2) is .3530. 
 The importance of these results is clear. First, they replicate the earlier finding of Julian, 
Hollander, and Regula (1969) that low-status members accord more endorsement to a leader 
under collective success than under collective failure. Second, they extend prior research by 
demonstrating that endorsement varies as a function of the payoff distribution; endorsement is 
lower when the leader usurps large payoffs for himself than when he allocates payoffs more 
evenly. Third, these results show that endorsement is a negative function of vulnerability, 
although this effect is small. 
 Surprisingly, the data also indicate that other support does not affect endorsement. 
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This result contrasts with the findings of earlier studies (Michener & Lyons, 1972; Michener & 
Tausig, 1971), where other support heightened endorsement. Apparently, the difference occurs 
because success-failure and payoff distribution were varied over their entire range in the present 
study, while they were established as fixed parameters (at moderate-to-low levels) in the earlier 
research. Subjects in the present study based their judgments of the leader directly on 
information about success-failure and payoffs, rather than on the opinion of the other low-status 
member. In fact, high levels of other support did not lead to increased endorsement, but to 
derogation of the other low-status member. Semantic differential measures show that subjects 
rated the other member as less intelligent, less perceptive, and less influential under high support 
than under low support (𝑝𝑝 < .05 for each of these items). Evidently, the presence of another 
member supporting the leader is not sufficient to affect endorsement when definitive information 
on performance and rewards is directly available. 
Expanded Casual Model 
 Figure 2 portrays an expanded causal model incorporating attributed competence and 
fairness. This model treats competence and fairness as intervening between endorsement and the 
four independent variables. This causal sequence is established by the experimental design, with 
the measurements of competence and fairness coming after the manipulation of the independent 
variables, but before the measurement of endorsement. As in the previous model, the 
independent variables are assumed to be uncorrelated in the population. A direct causal relation 
is not postulated between competence and fairness, so the residual association between these 
variables is represented as a correlation between their error terms (the curved arrow in Figure 2). 
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 This expanded causal model involves three simultaneous equations, one each for 
competence (C), fairness (F), and endorsement (E). Expressed in terms of standardized partial 
regression coefficients, these equations are the following: 
𝐶𝐶 =  .720𝑆𝑆 +  .076𝑃𝑃 + .067𝑂𝑂 + .367𝑉𝑉 +  .687𝑒𝑒2  (2) 
𝐹𝐹 =  −.032𝑆𝑆 +  .785𝑃𝑃 −  .024𝑂𝑂 −  .018𝑉𝑉 +  .618𝑒𝑒2  (3) 
𝐸𝐸 =  −.058𝑆𝑆 + .159𝑃𝑃 −  .013𝑂𝑂 −  .158𝑉𝑉 +  .580𝐶𝐶 +  .318𝐹𝐹 +  .713 𝑒𝑒1  (4) 
 Significance tests for Equation 2 indicate that only the effect of success-failure on 
competence differs from zero, 𝑝𝑝 < .001; no other effects are significant. Tests for Equation 3 
show that payoff distribution is the only significant determinant of fairness, 𝑝𝑝  < .0001, while 
tests for Equation 4 indicate that vulnerability, 𝑝𝑝 < .01, competence, 𝑝𝑝 < .0001, and fairness, 𝑝𝑝 < 
.001, are all significant determinants of endorsement. Despite its apparent size, the direct effect 
of payoff distribution on endorsement (Equation 4) is not significantly different from zero. The 
results indicate correlated error between competence and fairness, with 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒2𝑒𝑒5 = -.204. 
Interpretively, this means that some (unknown) variable not explicitly entered in the model is 
causing both competence and fairness; this variable is taken to be uncorrelated with the four 
independent variables. The coefficient of determination (R2) for endorsement in Equation 4 is 
.4911, which means that the variables in this model are, explaining about half the variance in 
endorsement.  
 These results are important substantively, for they show that competence and fairness 
mediate the effects of the manipulated variables on endorsement.1 As indicated by the pattern of 
                                                          
1 The causal model in Figure 2 assumes that 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒1𝑒𝑒2  = 0 and 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒1𝑒𝑒3  = 0. A critic might question this assumption 
because subjects were obviously not randomly assigned to "levels" of competence and fairness. If this assumption of 
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regression coefficients, competence mediates the effect of success-failure on endorsement 
(Equations 2 and 4), while fairness mediates the impact of payoff distribution on endorsement 
(Equations 3 and 4). Moreover, mediation is almost complete, because the direct effects of 
success-failure and payoff distribution on endorsement drop virtually to zero when competence 
and fairness are included in the model (Equation 4). Only the small effect of vulnerability on 
endorsement is not mediated to any appreciable degree by competence and fairness. 
Discussion 
 The expanded causal model corroborates and extends prior research on endorsement. The 
finding that competence determines endorsement accords with results reported by Julian, 
Hollander, and Regula (1969) and by Hollander and Julian (1970). The finding that fairness 
affects endorsement is new. More important, this research reveals two distinct causal chains 
producing endorsement. Collective-success-failure affected endorsement through attributed 
competence. And, consistent with the theoretical reasoning of Hollander and Julian (1970), the 
payoff distribution affected endorsement through attributed fairness. These patterns demonstrate 
that low-status subjects assimilated the group's structure in terms of the personal attributes of the 
leader. Depending on the group's structural situation, the leader was viewed as competent 
                                                          
uncorrelated error is false, the coefficients for the effect of competence on endorsement (.580) and for the effect of 
fairness on endorsement (.318) are biased and inconsistent. To check this possibility, an alternative model was 
estimated in which 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒1𝑒𝑒2  and 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒1𝑒𝑒3  were not assumed to equal zero; to achieve identification, the direct paths from 
other support and success-failure to endorsement were subject to zero restrictions. Coefficients for this alternative 
model were estimated by means of two-stage least squares (Johnston, 1963; Miller, 1971). Results show that 
although some correlated error is present (with 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒1𝑒𝑒2  = .558 and 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒1𝑒𝑒3 , = .395), competence and fairness are still 
important mediating variables for endorsement. The regression coefficient for endorsement on competence is .381, 
while that for endorsement on fairness is .409. Thus, these results reinforce the basic conclusion of the model in 
Figure 2. 
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(or incompetent) and as fair (unfair), and these perceptions in turn led to differences in 
endorsement. 
 Overall, these causal chains suggest that group members apply two distinct criteria when 
assessing formal leaders. The task criterion concerns a leader's ability to advance the interests of 
the group and its members. The moral criterion concerns a leader's commitment to higher social 
ideals transcending personal interests (Kelley, 1971), and reflects his desire to act on behalf of 
the collective welfare. In the present study, the measures of competence and fairness reflect the 
leader's standing on the task and moral dimensions, respectively. 
 One final note. A critic might argue that knowledge of endorsement is of little practical 
use, unless endorsement relates to some important behavior or outcome. Data in the present 
study, however, show that highly endorsed leaders were less likely to be removed from office 
than poorly endorsed leaders. The zero-order correlation between the leader's endorsement and 
the subjects' ouster attempts is substantial, 𝑟𝑟 = -.742, 𝑝𝑝 < .001. Knowledge of endorsement would 
forecast tenure in office.  
Reference Note 
1. Michener, H. A., & Burt, M. R. The use of social influence under varying conditions of 
legitimacy. Unpublished manuscript, University of Wisconsin—Madison, 1972. 
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Table 1. Zero-Order Correlations 
 
Figure 1. Basic casual model.  
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Figure 2. Expanded casual model with mediating variables.  
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